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 ‘THE DUBLIN PROCESS, IN ITS CURRENT 
FORM, IS OBSOLETE’1 
 On 4 May 2016, the European Commission 
submitted a proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council 
‘establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States 
by a third-country national or stateless person 
(recast).’ The proposal for the recast of the 
Dublin Regulation forms part of the legislative 
package presented by the Commission in its 
April 2016 Communication, ‘Towards a reform 
of the Common European Asylum System and 
enhancing legal avenues to Europe.’ 
Underpinning the Commission’s decision to 
strengthen the EU’s legal framework on asylum 
was the need to resolve ‘the weaknesses in the 
design and implementation’ of the Dublin 
system, which had been exposed by the 
unprecedented movement of persons seeking 
international protection to the EU in 2015.2 
The Dublin Regulation is the EU’s system for 
designating a member state responsible for an 
asylum application. The principal aim of the 
system is ‘to guarantee that every third country 
national seeking asylum in the Dublin area has 
swift access to status determination, while 
preventing him from pursuing multiple claims in 
several member states, with the overarching aim 
According to member states and EU officials, 
the European Union is now slowly entering a 
period of ‘post crisis.’ In this fragile period of 
stability, the European Commission has 
begun its task of strengthening the EU’s 
legislative framework on asylum. The focal 
point of the Commission’s task has been the 
reform of the Dublin system which, during 
the ‘asylum crisis,’ had almost collapsed. 
This policy brief has three aims. Firstly, it 
examines how the unprecedented movement 
of over one million persons seeking 
international protection to the EU in 2015 led 
to the fragmentation of the Dublin system. 
Secondly, it examines the main flaws of the 
Dublin system, namely the disconnect 
between the unchanged status quo on the 
Dublin rules and the ever-changing political 
and economic environment of the EU. 
Finally, it examines the Commission’s 
proposal for the recast of the Dublin system, 
assessing whether the new elements are 
adequate in resolving the key problems of the 
system. It is argued that although the reform 
does address, to a limited extent, the 
problems of secondary movement and the 
overburdening of some member state asylum 
systems, the reform does not sufficiently 
resolve the key flaws of Dublin in light of 
potential future migratory challenges. 
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of speeding up and rationalising the treatment of 
asylum claims.’3 In order to achieve this aim, the 
Regulation contains a hierarchy of criteria that 
determines which member state must take 
responsibility for the asylum application process. 
The entry of over one million persons during 
2015, however, threw the Dublin system and its 
rules on responsibility into disarray.  
Although the Dublin Regulation contains a list 
of criteria to determine which member state 
should take responsibility, the rule that is most 
often automatically applied across the EU is the 
first irregular entry principle. In times of mass 
inflows along specific migratory routes, 
however, this rule places significant pressure on 
a limited number of member states, namely 
those at the EU’s borders. As a consequence, 
countries such as Italy and Greece have 
struggled to effectively process the 
unprecedented number of arrivals seeking 
international protection, with their national 
reception and integration capacities being placed 
under severe strain. Due to a lack in both 
administrative and financial capacity, these 
member states have struggled to fulfil their 
obligations under the Common European 
Asylum System such as the fingerprinting of all 
persons entering their territory and providing 
swift access to asylum procedures. In addition, 
the perception that these rules have unfairly 
unburdened border states has also resulted in 
instances of non-compliance. Italy and Greece 
have been criticised for taking a permissive 
attitude toward instances of onward movement 
to destinations of preference.  
As a result of this secondary movement, 
countries such as Germany and Sweden have 
been faced with large increases in applications 
for asylum while others such as those across the 
Eastern border have been transformed into 
countries of transit. The uncontrolled 
movement of persons has led to a number of 
member states suspending the Schengen system. 
In addition member states have also taken 
further unilateral measures such as the building 
of fences and the changing of national asylum 
laws to dissuade persons from travelling and 
seeking asylum in these countries. The 
unprecedented inflows of those seeking 
international protection has exposed the 
shortcomings of the EU’s Dublin system and 
placed the functioning of its Common 
European Asylum System and Schengen in 
jeopardy.  
WHY IS DUBLIN SO PROBLEMATIC? 
On the one hand, the Dublin system has been 
‘lauded as the cornerstone of the EU’s Common 
European Asylum System.’4 On the other hand, 
it has been equally ‘vilified as a failure of 
solidarity and burden sharing among European 
Union member states.’ Some member states see 
the Dublin system as ‘essential to the effective 
operations of their asylum systems.’ For these 
member states, the Dublin Regulation 
constitutes a legal framework, which requires 
each member state to fulfil their obligations of 
processing an asylum claim. A mechanism, such 
as the Dublin system, is required to ensure that 
all member states participate in responsibility 
allocation and prevent cases of free riding.  
Conversely, other member states have argued 
that the Dublin system contributes to this 
asymmetrical sharing of responsibility and free 
riding. The system, with its emphasis on a single 
member state as responsible, allows for those 
countries unaffected by refugee inflows to avoid 
engaging in responsibility sharing arrangements. 
The Dublin system not only reinforces the idea 
that asylum applications are a national 
competence, but that sudden inflows are a 
problem for other governments to deal with. 
Member states that consistently receive the most 
asylum applications and those situated 
geographically at the main entry points have 
criticised the lack solidarity from other countries 
of EU, especially considering the refusal of 
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some to participate in the relocation schemes 
agreed to in 2015.  
Yet if we assess the original aim of the system, 
the Regulation was not ‘designed to equalise or 
share the asylum burden.’ The central purpose 
underpinning the creation of the Dublin 
Convention in 1990 was to develop ‘a 
mechanism that swiftly assigns responsibility for 
processing an individual asylum application to a 
single member state.’ At the time of the 
agreement, the rules on responsibility perhaps 
had a certain logic to them. The criticism that 
the system is inherently flawed is therefore not 
completely accurate. Rather, the problem also 
stems from the tension between the decision by 
member states to maintain the status quo on the 
Dublin rules and the dramatically changing 
context in which the system operates.  
Since the original agreement in 1990, the 
European Union has expanded from twelve 
member states to twenty-eight, radically 
changing the geographical shape of the EU’s 
borders and neighbourhood. In addition, with 
the Arab uprisings and the outbreak of violent 
conflict in Syria since 2011, the nature of 
migratory flows to the European Union has 
changed, with increasing numbers arriving since 
as early as 2013. The central problem is that by 
maintaining a status quo on its original form, the 
Dublin system is no longer responsive to the 
kind of migratory challenges faced by EU 
member states.  
EXPLAINING THE PRE-CRISIS STATUS 
QUO 
The status quo on Dublin has been maintained 
largely because the majority of EU member 
states are reluctant to engage in a reform that 
may require them to take on additional 
responsibilities. In fact, the system can be 
conceptualised as competitive game in which 
member states seek to minimise their ‘burden’ 
of asylum applications. This defensive behaviour 
has at times had drastic outcomes on the asylum 
systems of other member states. A prime 
example is the ‘well documented practice of 
piling requests on patently failed national asylum 
systems, disregarding the rights of applicants 
and the functioning of the CEAS as a whole.’5  
Some measures have been taken in an attempt 
to demonstrate solidarity but also to ensure a 
compromise is achieved on the existing rules of 
the Dublin system. This includes measures such 
as the Early Warning and Preparedness 
Mechanism, which was created by the 2013 
recast of the Dublin system. The measure aimed 
to support member states whose asylum systems 
were under strain from sudden and high inflows. 
However, not only was the system never 
implemented, it also placed additional 
responsibilities on border states. The 
mechanism was never activated because ‘some 
member states argued that the conditions for 
triggering the mechanism were never fulfilled.’6 
Others have argued that ‘it is difficult to reach a 
political agreement on triggering the mechanism 
in the absence of clear criteria and indicators to 
measure the pressure.’ In addition, the 
mechanism places an obligation on member 
states under pressure to invest resources in 
producing crisis management action plans with 
often little support from other EU member 
states. Overall, both the Dublin system and its 
solidarity mechanisms have reinforced the 
perception that the management of sudden and 
large inflows is a national issue.  
The status quo on this perception may have 
been maintained easily enough during periods of 
relatively low inflows. The movement of over 
one million persons to the EU seeking 
international protection, however, forced the 
EU and member states to recognise that the 
Dublin system required a reassessment. The 
Commission acknowledged that even ‘with a 
more efficient and stricter enforcement by all 
Member States of the existing rules… there is a 
high likelihood that the current system would 
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remain unsustainable in the face of continuing 
migratory pressure.’ The following section 
examines the new elements introduced by 
Dublin IV, and whether the reform can resolve 
the key problems of the Dublin system.  
WHAT’S NEW ABOUT DUBLIN IV? 
Among a number of technical reforms, the 
Dublin IV recast seeks to address two key 
phenomena that were witnessed in 2015, namely 
the uncontrolled secondary movement of 
persons and the critical pressure placed on 
border states as a result of the Dublin 
responsibility rules. The Commission seeks to 
respond to these two challenges through three 
steps. The first is to sanction applicants for 
secondary movement by placing their claims 
through accelerated procedures. In the proposal 
for the recast, the Commission states that a new 
obligation will be introduced that ‘foresees that 
an applicant must apply in the member state 
either of first irregular entry or, in the case of 
legal stay, in that member state.’ In the case of 
‘non-compliance…by the applicant, the Member 
State must examine the application in 
accelerated procedures.’ This new element is 
aimed at ensuring ‘an orderly management of 
flows, to facilitate the determination of the 
Member State responsible, and to prevent 
secondary movement.’  
The second step adopted by the Commission is 
to stabilise the allocation of responsibility. The 
new recast ‘introduces a rule that once a 
member state has examined the application as 
member state responsible, it remains responsible 
for examining future representations and 
applications of the given applicant.’ The aim is 
to strengthen the rule that ‘only one member 
state is and shall remain responsible for 
examining an application and that the criteria of 
responsibility shall be applied only once.’ This 
new provision is intended to remove any 
incentives ‘applicants may have to abscond in 
order to forestall a transfer’ as the ‘expiry of 
deadlines will no longer result in a shift of 
responsibilities between member states.’ In 
doing so, the new recast resolves the ambiguity 
surrounding the deadline of previous transfer 
charges.  
The third step proposed by the Commission is 
the creation of a corrective allocation 
mechanism to support member states facing 
significant pressure from sudden and high 
inflows of persons seeking asylum. The aim of 
the mechanism is to ‘ensure a fair sharing of 
responsibility between member states and a 
swift access for applicants to status 
determination procedures when a member state 
is confronted with a disproportionate number of 
applicants.’ The system would function in a 
similar way to the relocation schemes, in which 
an applicant will be transferred from an 
overburdened state so their application can be 
examined by another member state. The 
mechanism is automatically triggered when a 
member state receives 150% of its fair share of 
asylum applications. At this point, applicants will 
be relocated elsewhere in the EU. 
CONCLUSION: SHORTSIGHTED 
SOLUTION TO LONG TERM CHALLENGES 
Although the recast introduces new elements to 
tackle the issues of secondary movement and 
the lack of solidarity among member states, the 
proposal remains insufficient. Firstly, the added 
provision allowing member states to sanction 
asylum seekers reveals a more coercive trend in 
EU asylum policy and does not necessarily 
address the reasons why asylum seekers choose 
to move. Secondly, this rule is only effective if 
the asylum seeker has been registered. It does 
not resolve the main contributing factor of 
secondary movement, the avoidance of 
registration in first entry countries. 
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The proposal for the stabilisation of 
responsibilities will help with preventing 
member states from circumventing the deadlines 
for accepting responsibility and reducing the 
incentives for asylum seekers to abscond. 
However, this provision can only be effective in 
an environment of mutual trust and solidarity. 
Incentives to circumvent rules exist because 
some member states perceive the responsibility 
rules as unfair. In order to develop trust, the 
system needs to move beyond a competitive 
game of responsibility avoidance. The 
Commission’s proposal for a corrective 
allocation mechanism is a step in the right 
direction. However, the challenge with the new 
solidarity mechanism is that it does not 
necessarily provide the right solution to the 
actual challenges faced by border states.  
Firstly, the measure stipulates that the 
benefitting member states, the state of first 
application and the one carrying out the 
allocation process, would be required to 
undertake additional responsibilities prior to the 
application of the mechanism. These 
responsibilities include identifying applications, 
registering claims, carrying out admissibility 
screenings and taking responsibility for 
inadmissible applications and unfounded claims. 
As such, these ‘benefitting’ member states 
would in fact be dealing with a ‘sizeable share of 
the returns of rejected asylum seekers’, an aspect 
of EU asylum policy that remains a substantial 
challenge to implement. This has led to a 
number of criticisms that Dublin IV would in 
fact ‘aggravate current imbalances in 
responsibility among member states’ by 
designating ‘gatekeeper’ responsibilities to 
irregular entry states, which in practice would be 
the already overburdened states of Italy and 
Greece.  
Secondly, member states of allocation would be 
eligible to refuse the transfer on two grounds: 
firstly, on the ground of national and public 
security concerns, and secondly, through the 
‘pay to not play’ exemption. Each year member 
states can declare themselves unavailable as 
member states of allocation for the duration of 
12 months. During this time, the member state 
would be required to make a ‘solidarity 
contribution’ of 250,000 euros for each 
application, which would have been allocated to 
them. There has been some concern that such 
exemptions will simply reinforce the incentives 
of member states to not participate in 
responsibility sharing.  
Thirdly, the mechanism is conceived as a 
measure to be applied during instances of high 
inflows. Framed in this way, the system 
presumes that such high inflows are temporary, 
and that once numbers return below the 
threshold of 150% the mechanism can be 
suspended. The mechanism does not consider 
the long term structural changes to migratory 
flows, in which the regional conflicts will 
continue to produce high numbers of refugees.  
Ultimately, the Commission concluded that ‘the 
current criteria in the Dublin system should be 
preserved,’ leading to criticisms that the Dublin 
system, in its operation, ‘will remain unchanged.’ 
Despite this criticism, it is important to take into 
consideration the feasibility of a foundational 
reform in this political climate where there is 
little political will and appetite for further 
integration.  
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